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Trust	spillovers:	Does	increasing	public	trust	in	the
EU’s	institutions	undermine	support	for	national
institutions?
Several	studies	have	identified	a	link	between	the	public’s	trust	in	national
institutions	and	their	trust	in	the	EU’s	institutions.	Yet	the	effect	of	this	link	is
unclear,	with	some	studies	finding	that	an	increase	in	trust	in	national
institutions	boosts	trust	in	the	EU’s	institutions,	and	other	studies	identifying
the	opposite	relationship.	Drawing	on	a	new	study,	Goran	Dominioni,
Alberto	Quintavalla	and	Alessandro	Romano	explain	that	the	relationship
between	trust	in	national	and	EU	institutions	is	bilateral,	almost	always	asymmetric,	and	that	spillover	effects
change	over	time.
Public	trust	in	political	institutions	is	a	key	determinant	of	the	political	life	of	the	European	Union.	Importantly,	in	the
European	Union,	governance	is	shared	among	institutions	that	operate	at	the	supranational	and	the	national	level,
and	changes	in	the	trust	in	an	institution	situated	at	one	level	can	affect	trust	in	institutions	situated	at	the	other
level.	But	what	is	the	effect,	direction,	and	intensity	of	these	spillovers?	In	a	recent	study,	we	answer	this	question.
Research	has	long	shown	that	changes	in	political	trust	in	national	institutions	affect	institutions	at	other	levels,	but
the	effect	of	these	spillovers	is	debated.	According	to	the	so-called	‘congruence	theory’,	changes	in	trust	in	national
institutions	should	affect	public	trust	towards	European	institutions	in	the	same	direction.	For	instance,	if	trust
towards	a	country’s	national	parliament	increases,	trust	in	the	EU’s	institutions	should	also	increase.	On	the
contrary,	the	so-called	‘compensation	theory’	states	that	a	change	in	trust	in	national	institutions	should	produce	the
opposite	effect	when	it	comes	to	trust	in	European	institutions.	For	example,	if	trust	in	a	country’s	national
parliament	increases,	we	might	find	that	public	trust	in	the	European	Commission	would	decrease.
Existing	research	provides	mixed	results	that	support	both	theories.	The	conflicting	findings	derive	from	an
incomplete	understanding	of	inter-institutional	dynamics.	These	theories	implicitly	assume	that	spillovers	only	go
from	the	national	to	the	European	level,	and	that	their	effect	is	constant	over	time.	On	the	contrary,	we	show	that
the	impact	of	spillovers	can	change	over	time	and	space	and	that	spillovers	are	bidirectional.	That	is,	changes	in
trust	in	the	European	Union	also	affect	the	national	level.
Consequently,	our	first	contribution	is	to	propose	a	taxonomy	of	possible	forms	of	interactions	among	European	and
national	institutions.	We	say	that	two	institutions	are	interacting	when	there	are	trust	spillovers	among	them.
Moreover,	we	say	that	the	kind	of	interaction	between	two	institutions	is	defined	in	terms	of	the	direction	(that	can
be	either	unilateral	or	bilateral)	and	the	‘sign’	(that	can	be	either	positive	or	negative)	of	the	spillovers	between
these	institutions.	We	show	that	there	are	eight	possible	types	of	interactions	among	institutions	at	the	two	levels	of
governance.
The	table	below	describes	the	eight	types	of	interactions.	Four	of	these	interactions	are	unilateral.	That	is,	spillovers
only	go	from	one	level	to	the	other.	Despite	the	fact	that	the	literature	has	focused	on	unilateral	spillovers,	we	do	not
find	any	evidence	that	these	forms	of	interactions	emerge.	The	other	four	are	bilateral.	These	bilateral	interactions
can	be	either	symmetric	(‘bilateral	congruence’	and	‘bilateral	compensation’)	or	asymmetric	(‘asymmetric
interactions	of	type	I’	and	‘asymmetric	interactions	of	type	II’).
An	interaction	is	symmetric	if	changes	in	trust	in	national	and	European	institutions	produce	the	same	kind	of
spillover	effect	in	each	direction.	For	instance,	according	to	our	results,	between	2008	and	2012,	the	national
parliament	of	Belgium	and	the	European	Parliament	entered	into	a	relationship	of	bilateral	compensation.	Here,	an
increase	in	trust	in	Belgium’s	national	parliament	would	be	expected	to	produce	a	negative	spillover	onto	the
European	Parliament	and	an	increase	in	trust	in	the	European	Parliament	would	be	expected	to	produce	a	negative
spillover	onto	the	national	parliament.
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: Trust spillovers: Does increasing public trust in the EU’s institutions undermine support for national
institutions?
Page 1 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2020-01-29
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/01/29/trust-spillovers-does-increasing-public-trust-in-the-eus-institutions-undermine-support-for-national-institutions/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
Alternatively,	an	interaction	is	asymmetric	when	changes	in	trust	in	national	and	European	institutions	produce	the
opposite	kind	of	spillover	effect	in	each	direction.	For	example,	our	results	show	the	existence	of	an	asymmetric
interaction	between	the	national	parliament	of	Denmark	and	the	European	Parliament	after	2012.	In	this	case,	an
increase	in	trust	in	the	national	parliament	would	be	expected	to	generate	a	positive	spillover	onto	the	European
Parliament,	but	an	increase	in	trust	in	the	European	Parliament	would	be	expected	to	generate	a	negative	spillover
onto	the	national	parliament.
Table:	Eight	interactions	between	trust	in	national	and	European	institutions
Note:	For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	study	in	European	Union	Politics
Our	second	contribution	is	to	test	which	types	of	interaction	emerge	between	the	national	parliaments	of	15
member	states	and	the	European	Commission,	the	European	Parliament	and	the	European	Central	Bank	in	the
period	2000-2015.	Our	results	indicate	that	spillovers	between	national	parliaments	and	EU	institutions	are	bilateral,
almost	always	asymmetric,	and	their	sign	changes	over	time.	Thus,	the	two	predominant	theories	of	trust	spillovers
fail	to	accurately	describe	the	types	of	interactions	that	we	observe.
These	findings	have	important	implications,	since	they	show	that	simultaneously	increasing	public	trust	in	both
European	and	national	institutions	might	be	a	complex	undertaking.	Take,	for	example,	the	case	of	the	United
Kingdom.	After	2009,	we	find	an	asymmetric	interaction	between	the	national	parliament	and	the	European
Commission	and	European	Parliament,	where	an	increase	in	trust	towards	national	institutions	reduces	trust
towards	EU	ones.	Now	assume	that	British	authorities	wanted	to	start	a	campaign	to	increase	trust	in	the	national
parliament.	If	successful,	such	a	campaign	would	have	undermined	trust	in	the	EU’s	institutions.	On	the	contrary,
an	action	aimed	at	increasing	trust	in	the	EU	would	have	also	increased	trust	in	the	national	parliament.
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We	also	believe	that	our	findings	call	for	further	research	on	two	fronts.	First,	research	should	focus	on
understanding	the	determinants	of	the	interactions.	This	will	facilitate	the	task	of	building	trust	in	national	and	EU
institutions	by	creating	mutualistic	interactions.	Second,	we	observe	that	interaction	dynamics	are	similar	in	some
countries.	For	instance,	this	is	the	case	of	interactions	between	the	national	parliaments	of	Italy	and	Spain	in	the
period	2000-2012.	Future	research	could	study	whether	there	are	common	determinants	of	these	dynamics.
For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	study	in	European	Union	Politics
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
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